Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL SIQUEIROS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. <u>16-cv-07244-EMC</u>

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Docket No. 324

Pending before the Court is Defendant General Motors LLC's ("GM's") motion for reconsideration. See Docket No. 324 ("Mot."). For the following reasons, the motion is **GRANTED** in part and **DENIED** in part.

In its May 25, 2021 order, the Court held that *immediate* or *direct* privity of contract is *not* required to bring a claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA). See Docket No. 320 ("Order") at 9. Instead, Idaho Plaintiffs need only show that their ICPA claims are "founded on a contract, not that the contract must be one entered into *directly* by the plaintiff and the defendant [i.e., GM]." Id. (emphases added) (citing In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig. ("FCA"), 295 F. Supp. 3d 927, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018) and Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (Idaho 2010)). The Court then certified the ICPA claim for classwide adjudication. *Id.* at 37–38.

GM asks for leave to file a motion to urge the Court to reconsider its certification of the ICPA claim because "the Court did not consider whether plaintiffs could establish privity by classwide evidence common to all class members, including those who acquired used vehicles from third-parties and non-GM dealerships, and did not address GM's uncontroverted evidence that the

majority of Idaho class members did not purchase new vehicles from GM-authorized dealerships."

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2 Mot. at 2 (emphases added). The Court agrees to the extent that the Idaho class cannot include 3 individuals who purchased their vehicles from third parties who are unaffiliated with GM. See Taylor, 243 P.3d at 662. The Court held that the ICPA only requires indirect privity between the 4 Idaho Plaintiffs and GM; thus, Plaintiffs who purchased their vehicle from a GM-authorized 5 dealer have standing to sue. See Order at 9. Plaintiffs who purchased their vehicle from third 6 7 parties and who do not have indirect privity with GM (through a GM-authorized dealer) do not 8 have standing. Id. Here, Idaho Plaintiff Gabriel Del Valle has standing because he testified that 9 he purchased his vehicle from "Meridian Chevrolet just outside of Boise, Idaho," which is a GMauthorized dealer. See Docket 293-5 ("Del Valle Dep. Tr.") at 17:14-16, 38:9-13. 10 Plaintiffs argue that this Court's decisions in FCA, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1022, and In re

Toyota RAV4 Hybrid Fuel Tank Litig. ("Rav4"), No. 20-cv-00337, 2021 WL 1338949, at *25-26 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2021), stand for the proposition that any contractual transaction to purchase a Class Vehicle is sufficient to show privity. However, the plaintiffs in those cases—like Mr. Del Valle here—purchased their vehicles from Chrysler-authorized and Toyota-authorized dealers, not from third parties entirely unrelated to those defendants. See FCA, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 1022; Rav4, 2021 WL 1338949, at *25-*26. Therefore, the result under the facts of those cases is not inconsistent with the holding here that Idaho Plaintiffs—including unnamed class members must show that they have *indirect* privity with GM. To hold that the Idaho Plaintiffs can sue GM under the ICPA if they entered into any contract with anyone to purchase their vehicles, regardless of whether the transaction had any connection whatsoever with GM, would eliminate the substantive privity requirement under Idaho state law altogether. After all, in nearly every instance (with the exception e.g. of gifts and inheritances), acquisition of a vehicle involves some contract whether express or implied.

That being said, the ICPA claim is still suitable for class-wide adjudication because the

The Court does not agree with GM that only individuals who purchased new Class Vehicles from GM-authorized dealerships have privity of contract with GM. For example, individuals who purchased used Class Vehicles from GM-authorized dealers during the class period could still be part of the class.

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United States District Court Northern District of California

class definition can be narrowed to include only putative class members who purchased Class
Vehicles from a GM-authorized dealer. Accordingly, the Court amends the definition of the Idaho
Class as follows (additions in italics and underlined):

1. Idaho Class. All current owners or lessees of a Class Vehicle that was purchased or leased in the State of Idaho *from a GM-authorized dealer*. The Court certifies the claims of the Idaho Class for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code Ann. §§ 48-601–48-619. The Court appoints Gabriel Del Valle as the class representative for the Idaho Class.

Accordingly, GM's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is **GRANTED** in **part** and **DENIED** in **part**. To the extent the prior Order suffered from any ambiguity, this order serves to clarify such ambiguity.

This order disposes of Document No. 324.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2021

EDWARD M. CHEN United States District Judge